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The program put forward in von Wright’s last works defines deontic logic as “a study
of conditions which must be satisfied in rational norm-giving activity” and thus in-
troduces the perspective of logical pragmatics. In this paper a formal explication for
von Wright’s program is proposed within the framework of set-theoretic approach and
extended to a two-sets model which allows for the separate treatment of obligation-
norms and permission norms. The three translation functions connecting the language
of deontic logic with the language of the extended set-theoretical approach are intro-
duced, and used in proving the correspondence between the deontic theorems, on
one side, and the perfection properties of the norm-set and the “counter-set”, on the
other side. In this way the possibility of reinterpretation of standard deontic logic as
the theory of perfection properties that ought to be achieved in norm-giving activ-
ity has been formally proved. The extended set-theoretic approach is applied to the
problem of rationality of principles of completion of normative systems. The paper
concludes with a plaidoyer for logical pragmatics turn envisaged in the late phase of
Von Wright’s work in deontic logic.
Keywords: Deontic logic, logical pragmatics, reinterpretation of standard deontic
logic, G.H. von Wright.
1 Von Wright’s reinterpretation of deontic logic
The foundational role and crucial influence of Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–
2003) in the development of deontic logic is beyond dispute. 2 Recently, Bu-
lygin [3] has has divided von Wright’s work in deontic logic in four phases: 1)
dogmatic phase of 1950s marked by ignoring the fact that norms do not have
truth-value; 2) eclectic phase of “Norm and Action” introducing the distinction
between logic of norms and logic of norm propositions; 3) sceptic phase marked
1 This work has been supported in part by Croatian Science Foundation’s funding of the
project IP-2014-09-9378 and by the grant of Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences,
University of Split.
2 Although usually called “the founding father of deotic logic”, Von Wright preferred and
used the term ‘midwife’ to denote his role in the development of the discipline.
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by the thesis that logic of norms is impossible; 4) logic without truth-phase with
the reinterpretation of deontic logic as the study of rationality conditions of the
norm-giving activity. Von Wright’s reinterpretation of deontic logic given in
his later works (from 1980s onwards) has remained a non-formalized manifesto
which so far has not received a fuller elaboration. In this paper the reinterpre-
tation will be understood as the turn towards logical pragmatics. An exemplar
programmatic statement is given in the following quote.
Deontic logic, one could also say, is neither a logic of norms nor a logic
of norm-propositions but a study of conditions which must be satisfied in
rational norm-giving activity. [13, p.111]
Von Wright’s reinterpretation of deontic logic developed gradually and has
introduced important conceptual distinctions and theses, among which the fol-
lowing stand out: the distinction between prescriptive and descriptive use of
deontic sentences [10]; the thesis that relation between permission and absence
of prohibition is not conceptual but normative in character [12]; this relation
is one among “perfection properties” of normative system that the norm-giver
ought to achieve in norm-giving activity [14,15]. These theses are mutually
supporting. A normative systems can come into existence thanks to the pre-
scriptive use of language . The logical properties of real normative systems
can be described using the language of the “logic of norm-propositions”. Some
logical properties are “perfection-properties” of a normative-system. The ab-
sence of a certain perfection-property does not deprive a normative system of
its normative force. In the prescriptive use of language the norm-giver ought
to achieve some perfection properties of the normative system. Deontic logic is
a study of logical perfection properties; properties which act as the normative
source of requirements to which the norm-giver is subordinated.
Von Wright’s reinterpretation of deontic logic can be formally explicated
within the set-theoretic approach. The set-theoretic approach has been in-
troduced into the logic of normative systems by Alchourro´n and Bulygin [1].
Within this framework deontic sentences are treated as claims on member-
ship in the set of consequences Cn(N ) of “explicitly commanded propositions”
N . Thus, Oϕ in their approach means ϕ ∈ Cn(N ), while Pϕ is explicated
as ¬ϕ /∈ Cn(N ). More recently a refinement and generalization of the set-
theoretic approach has been developed by Broome [2] where the set of require-
ments is equated with the value of a code function, which takes as its arguments
a normative source, an actor and a situation. The major point of divergence
within the set-theoretic approaches lies in the properties that are assigned to
sets of norms or requirements [17]. It is in accord with the approach proposed
by Von Wright to treat real norm-sets, the one corresponding to obligation-
norms and the other to permission-norms, as simple sets consisting just of
affirmed and negated propositional contents of explicitly promulgated norms,
not presupposing any a priori given properties. Rather, it is the question of
compliance with second-order normativity whether a real normative system
posses desirable logical properties and approximates an ideal system. In the
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approach of this paper it is neither assumed that a norm-set is deductively
closed nor that it is closed under equivalence.
If permission and obligation are not interdefinable, then two types of con-
sistency should be distinguished. External consistency deals with the relation
between obligation-norms and permission norms: ¬(Oϕ ∧ P¬ϕ). Internal con-
sistency deals with obligation-norms alone: ¬(Oϕ ∧ O¬ϕ). According to Von
Wright, the set of obligation-norms ought to have perfection properties.
. . . classic deontic logic, on the descriptive interpretation of its formulas, pic-
tures a gapless and contradiction-free system of norms. A factual normative
order may have these properties, and it may be thought desirable that it
should have them. But can it be a truth of logic that a normative order has
(“must have”) these “perfection”-properties? [14, p.20]
Perfection properties produce “normative demands on normative systems” and
define “rationality conditions of norm-giving activity”. If the relation between
permission and absence of prohibition is not a conceptual relation, then an
addition to Von Wright’s outline is required. It is not sufficient to determine
perfection properties of the set of obligation-norms. Perfection properties of
the set corresponding to permission-norms must be taken into account, too, as
well as perfection relations between obligation-norms and permission-norms,
like external consistency. The needed extension of the set-theoretic approach
can be obtained by the addition of the set related to permission norms. The
formal explication of the relation between standard deontic logic and the theory
of normative system perfection properties requires a provision of the translation
function from the language of standard deontic logic without iterated operators
to the language of extended set-theoretic approach. The translation function
should reveal the fact that axioms of standard deontic logic are descriptions
of an ideal normative system, a system endowed with “perfection properties”.
These are the properties that a normative system ought have, as von Wright
noted, and, as will be argued here, these are the properties to which the norm-
giver and the norm-recipient relate in their corrective activities when faced
with an imperfect normative system.
2 Perfection properties of a normative system
According to the extended Von Wright’s reinterpretation of deontic logic the
norm-giver and the norm-recipient relate to the ideal concepts of obligation
and permission.
Definition 2.1 Let Lpl be the language of propositional logic. A set N ⊆ Lpl
is called norm-set and contains contents of obligation-norms. A set N ⊆ Lpl
is called counter-set and contains negated contents of permission-norms. A
normative system is the pair 〈N ,N〉.
The ideal concepts of obligation and permission can be explicated by point-
ing out the “perfection properties” of their corresponding sets, namely, of the
norm-set and the counter-set. Since the filter structure and the weak-ideal
structure of the respective sets will be later recognized as responsible for their
4 Deontic logic as a study of conditions of rationality in norm-related activities
perfection properties these terms must be introduced. The first one is a well-
know concept while the second will be introduced here.
2.1 Filter and weak ideal
It is well-known fact that the set of truth-sets of sentences belonging to a
consistent and deductively closed set of sentences exemplifies a “filter” structure
[4]. A filter F is a set of subsets of a given set W satisfying the following
conditions [6, p.73]: (i) ∅ /∈ F , (ii) W ∈ F , (iii) if X ∈ F and Y ∈ F , then
X ∩ Y ∈ F , (iv) for all X,Y ⊆ W , if X ∈ F and X ⊆ Y , then Y ∈ F . In
classical propositional logic the set of sets of valuations {JϕK | ϕ ∈ Cn(T )}
is a filter if Cn(T ) is consistent, where T ⊆ Lpl is a theory, Cn(T ) = {ϕ |
T `pl ϕ} is its deductive closure, and JϕK = {v | v(ϕ) = t} is the truth-
set of ϕ. The properties of a filter can be reformulated in terms of logical
syntax. In particular, reformulated condition (iii) expresses the closure under
conjunction; reformulated condition (iv) expresses closure under entailment,
i.e., if ϕ ∈ Cn(T ) and ϕ entails ψ, then ψ ∈ Cn(T ).
On the other hand, the set-theoretic structure corresponding to the
“counter-theory”, L − Cn(T ) is closed in the opposite direction: if JϕK corre-
sponds to some ϕ ∈ (L−Cn(T )), then so does any subset of it. In the syntactic
reformulation: if ϕ ∈ (L−Cn(T )) and ψ entails ϕ, then ψ ∈ (L−Cn(T )). The
structure of an ‘ideal’ is a particular kind of structure, which can be found in
some but not all sets of truth-sets of sentences in counter-theories. An ideal I
is defined as a set of subsets of a given set W satisfying the following conditions
[6, p.73]: (i) ∅ ∈ I, (ii) W /∈ I, (iii) if X ∈ I and Y ∈ I, then X ∪ Y ∈ I, (iv)
for all X,Y ⊆ W , if X ∈ I and Y ⊆ X, then Y ∈ I. Conditions can be refor-
mulated in syntactic terms. In particular, condition (iv) can be reformulated
as the ‘closure under implicants’.
The complement of a filter needs not be an ideal, but if a theory is complete
and consistent, its corresponding filter will be maximal, and its complement
will be an ideal. The complement of any filter shares an essential property of
the structure of an ideal, namely the property of “closure under implicants” as
the first item in Proposition 2.2 shows.
Proposition 2.2 If S = W − F and F is a filter, then
(i) if JϕK ⊆ JψK and JψK ∈ S, then JϕK ∈ S,
(ii) if JϕK ∩ JψK ∈ S, then JϕK ∈ S or JψK ∈ S,
In this paper the question of logical structure of “counter-theory” will play
an important role in the determination of perfection properties of the counter-
set. Therefore, the new notion of weak ideal will be introduced.
Definition 2.3 A structure S is a weak ideal iff (i) JϕK ⊆ JψK and JψK ∈ S,
then JϕK ∈ S, and (ii) if JϕK ∩ JψK ∈ S, then JϕK ∈ S or JψK ∈ S.
Syntactic conditions corresponding to a weak ideal structure are: (i) inclu-
sion of at least one conjunct for each conjunction contained, and (ii) closure
under implicants, respectively.
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Proposition 2.4 Let T ⊆ Lpl and Cn(T ) 6= Lpl. The set {JϕK | ϕ ∈ Cn(T )}
is a filter. The set {JϕK | ϕ ∈ Lpl − Cn(T )} is a weak ideal.
3 Translations, theorems of standard deontic logic and
ideal normative systems
A formal explication of Von Wright’s reinterpretation of deontic logic asks for
the establishment of a connection between the theorems of standard deontic
logic and properties of ideal normative systems. For this purpose the transla-
tion function has been introduced in [17] connecting theorems standard deontic
logic with the properties of the norm-set. Now additional translations function
will be introduced, connecting deontic theorems also with the perfection prop-
erties of the counter-set and perfection relations between the norm-set and the
counter-set.
Definition 3.1 Language Lsdl is a deontic language without iterated modal-
ities: ϕ ::= p | Oϕ | Pϕ | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) |, where p is a sentence of language
Lpl of propositional logic. The definitions of deontic modality F and of truth-
functional connectives are standard.
Definition 3.2 Language Lns is the language of the norm-set and counter-set
membership within the extended set-theoretic approach: ϕ ::= p | ppq ∈ N |
ppq ∈ N | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | where p ∈ Lpl. 3
Definition 3.3 Functions τ+, τ−, τ∗ : Lsdl 7→ Lns translate formulas of the
deontic language Lsdl without iterated modalities to the language Lns of the
extended set-theoretic approach.
τ+(Oϕ) = pϕq ∈ N
τ+(Pϕ) = p¬ϕq /∈ N
τ+(P¬ϕ) = pϕq /∈ N
τ−(Oϕ) = pϕq /∈ N
τ−(Pϕ) = p¬ϕq ∈ N
τ−(P¬ϕ) = pϕq ∈ N
τ∗(Oϕ) = τ+(Oϕ)
τ∗(Pϕ) = τ−(Pϕ)
For ? = +,−, ∗
τ?(ϕ) = ϕ if ϕ ∈ Lpl
τ?(¬ϕ) = ¬τ?(ϕ)
τ?(ϕ ∧ ψ) = τ?(ϕ) ∧ τ?(ψ)
3 “Quine quotes”, p. . .q, will be omitted at most places in the subsequent text for the ease
of reading and writing.




norm-set properties counter-set properties
(D) Oϕ→ Pϕ consistency completeness
τ+(D) = ϕ ∈ N → ¬ϕ /∈ N τ−(D) = ϕ /∈ N → ¬ϕ ∈ N
(2∗) (Oϕ ∧Oψ) →
O(ϕ ∧ ψ)
closure under conjunction having at least one conjunct
for each conjunction
contained
τ+(2∗) = (ϕ ∈ N ∧ ψ ∈
N ) → (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ N
τ−(2∗) = (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ N →
(ϕ ∈ N ∨ ψ ∈ N )
(Rc)
`pl ϕ→ ψ
Oϕ→ Oψ deductive closure “closure under implicants”
τ+(Oϕ→ Oψ) = ϕ ∈ N →
ψ ∈ N if `pl ϕ→ ψ
τ−(Oϕ→ Oψ) = ψ ∈ N →
ϕ ∈ N if `pl ϕ→ ψ
relational properties
external consistency
(D*) Oϕ→ ¬P¬ϕ τ∗(D∗) = ϕ ∈ N → ϕ /∈ N
“gaplessness”
(Com) Oϕ ∨ P¬ϕ τ∗(Com) = ϕ ∈ N ∨ ϕ ∈ N
Table 1
Perfection properties come in non-equal pairs where each member is charcterized by
the same axiom or rule.
On counter-sets Although counter-intuitive at the first glance, the adequate
metaphor for permitting is that of putting the negation of the content into the
counter-set. This corresponds to the standard definition “ϕ is permitted iff it
is not obligatory that ¬ϕ” in the following way: since ¬ϕ cannot go into the
norm-set it must be placed into the counter-set. The perfection properties are
different for different sets since “ideal concepts” of obligation and permission
have different logical structure. For example, having a contradictory pair is an
imperfection property of the norm-set, but for the counter-set this is neither a
perfection nor an imperfection property. Similarly, completeness is a perfection
property for permissions but not for obligations: it is indifferent whether ϕ ∈
N ∨¬ϕ ∈ N holds, whereas ϕ ∈ N ∨¬ϕ ∈ N ought to hold. This model, as will
be shown, can account for the fact that perfection properties come in pairs, one
for obligations, another for permissions, both of which are characterized by the
same theorems of standard deontic logic, as shown in Table 1. The difference
in logical structure of the two sets is also visible from the following facts: A
perfect counter-set can have a contradictory pair of (negations) of permission-
norm contents, which means that a certain state of affairs is optional. This fact
does not cause an “explosion” since the principle ex contradictione quodlibet
does not hold for the ideal counter-set.
The proposed two-sets model bears resemblance to the relation between a
theory T and its counter-part L−Cn(T ). The counter-theory has logical prop-
erties such as “closure under the implicant” (if ψ ∈ L − Cn(T ) and ϕ entails
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A BNorm-set N ∗ Counter-set N ∗
Fig. 1. A comparison between imperfect system 〈N ,N〉 and system 〈N ∗,N ∗〉, which
is endowed with some perfection properties. System 〈N ,N〉 is internally inconsistent
under deductive closure; it is externally inconsistent as the presence of ϕ at the
intersection shows and makes both Oϕ and P¬ϕ true; it is also incomplete since
χ /∈ N ∪N . System 〈N ∗,N ∗〉 is externally consistent and complete.
ψ, then ϕ ∈ L − Cn(T ) ). The perfection properties of the descriptive theory
have been well investigated within the logic of natural sciences. For example,
the completeness of a theory, if attainable, counts as a perfection property,
but the completeness of the (obligation) norm-set is not its perfection prop-
erty. The mismatch holds also on the side of “counter-sets”: the completeness
of the descriptive counter-part L − Cn(T ) is an indifferent property, while in
the realm of normativity it is a perfection property of the “counter-set” rep-
resenting permission-norms. The construction is different, too: there is no
“exclusion” part in building a theory since rejecting a sentence equals accept-
ing its negation. This need not be the case with normative systems, whose
obligation and permission parts are separately built. These facts shows that
deontic logic as the study of “rationality conditions of norm-giving activity”
or “perfection properties of normative systems” is a sui generis logic. If one
accepts, together with von Wright, the central position of the phenomenon
of normativity in humanities and social sciences, then deontic logic plays the
prominent role in the philosophy of the science of man by revealing the logical
basis of its methodological autonomy.
4 Deontic logic as the theory of ideal normative systems
As Aristotle famously wrote in Nicomachean Ethics, “it is possible to fail in
many ways . . . while to succeed is possible only in one way”. The same goes
for constructing a normative system by prescriptive use of language: there are
many imperfect normative systems in reality, but only one ideal system, the
one, as will be proved here, described by standard deontic logic; compare Table
1.
An ideal normative system (ins) is internally (IntC) and externally con-
sistent (ExtC), its obligation norm-set is closed under conjunction (2*) and
entailment (Rc), and it is complete (Comp). An ideal normative system is
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characterized by the following axioms and rules:
(1) `ins > ∈ N
(2*) `ins (ϕ ∈ N ∧ ψ ∈ N )→ ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ N
(IntC) `ins ϕ ∈ N → ¬ϕ /∈ N
(ExtC) `ins ϕ ∈ N → ϕ /∈ N
(Comp) `ins ϕ ∈ N ∨ ϕ ∈ N
(RcO)
`pl ϕ→ ψ
`ins ϕ ∈ N → ψ ∈ N
(RcP)
`pl ϕ→ ψ
`ins ψ ∈ N → ϕ ∈ N
Other properties of an ideal normative system are consequences of these ax-
ioms and rules. In particular, perfection properties of the counter-set, closure
under implicant and inclusion of at least one conjunct for each conjunction con-
tained, can be derived in `ins. The three translation functions when applied
to theorems of standard deontic logic (sdl) yield the following descriptions:
• if `sdl ϕ, then τ+(ϕ) describes a perfection property of the (obligation)
norm-set;
• if `sdl ϕ, then τ−(ϕ) describes a perfection property of the (permission)
counter-set;
• if `sdl ϕ and both O and P occur in ϕ, then τ∗(ϕ) describes a perfection
relation between the norm-set and the counter-set.
Since translations of axioms and rules of standard deontic logic yield truths
about an ideal normative system, they can be understood as the theory of
ideal normative system thus confirming Von Wright’s conjecture.
Theorem 4.1 If `sdl ϕ, then `ins τ+(ϕ), `ins τ−(ϕ), and `ins τ∗(ϕ).
Proof. All axioms and rules of standard deontic logic can be derived in `ins.
Therefore, any step of a proof in `sdl can be reproduced within `ins. 2
For the purpose of illustration the proofs for `ins τ+(6.11), `ins τ−(KD),
and `ins τ∗(DD′) are given in the Appendix. 4 It should be noted that having
a norm-set with contingent content, i.e., N∩{ϕ |6`pl ϕ or 6`pl ¬ϕ} 6= ∅ does not
count as a perfection property of a normative system. Therefore, a nihilistic
normative system in which any contingent state of affairs is permitted and none
prohibited counts as an instance of an ideal normative system.
Von Wright’s “pilgrim’s progress” [13] from standard deontic logic to the
position he held in his later works in 1990s may look as a circle, but the ending
point is not the same. The theorems from 1950s still remain as theorems in
1990s deontic logic, but their position and character has been changed. They
cease to be theorems of the “logical syntax” of deontic language, and become
4 The notations for theorems (6.11), (KD), and (DD′) are taken over from [5].
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the theorems of the “logical pragmatics” of deontic language use. What had
been previously understood as a conceptual relation, later becomes a normative
relation; a norm for the norm-giving activity, and not the logic of the norms
being given.
4.1 Rationality of sealing principles
Completeness (“gaplessness”) of normative system is a perfection property that
is hardly achievable for any non-nihilistic system. Von Wright gives a vivid
definition of the problem and possible ways of solving it.
What is the difference “in practice” between a state of affairs not being pro-
hibited and its being permitted? Suppose there is a code of norms in which
there is no norm Pp. Now someone makes it so that p. What should be the
law-giver’s reaction to this, if any? Could he say: “You were not permitted
to do this and you must not do that which you are not permitted to do”?
He could say this, making it a meta-norm that everything not-permitted is
thereby forbidden. “Logically” this would be just as possible, even though
perhaps less reasonable, as to have a meta-norm permitting everything which
is not forbidden. But one can also think of some “middle way” between these
two principles, a meta-norm to the effect that if something is not permitted
by the existing norms of a code one must, as we say, ‘ask permission’ of the
law-giver to do it. [12, p.280]
According to von Wright there are three principles by use of which a normative
system can be completed: 1. (¬F . P) everything not forbidden is permitted,
2. (¬P .F) everything not permitted is forbidden, 3. normative gaps are filled
in communication between the norm-recipient and the norm-giver. The third
principle will be left aside because of its complexity. Using the two-sets model of
normative system it can be shown why the first principle is to be preferred over
the second one, i.e., why the first principle is “more reasonable”. In addition
to this it can be proved that the mere “logical possibility” of the second mode
(¬P .F) of filling normative gaps is not a sufficient condition of its rationality,
according to von Wright’s own criterion of rationality of norm-giving activity.
Definition 4.2 A norm-system 〈N ,N〉 is gapless iff {ϕ,¬ϕ} ⊆ N ∪N for all
doable states of affairs ϕ and ¬ϕ, i.e., Ldoable = N ∪N .
The notion of “doable state of affairs” is taken over from von Wright’s
works. The notion of doability introduces complex problems of logic of action.
Here the set of sentences describing doable states of affairs will be simplified
and identified with the set of contingent sentences, Ldoable = Lpl − {ϕ |`pl
ϕ or `pl ¬ϕ}.
The easy way of making a normative system complete is by applying the
principle everything which is not forbidden is permitted. The way of filling in
the gaps is straightforward, consisting in adding the missing sentences to the
counter set and thus obtaining its extension N ∗, as formula (1) shows.
N ∗ = N ∪ {ϕ | ϕ /∈ Cn(N )} (1)
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A completion of the normative system under the principle everything which
is not permitted is forbidden is not a functional relation. In this mode the
process is under-determined and so does not result in a unique system. The
completion proceeds in two steps, each of which includes a choice.
The first step In the first step the counter-set must be completed in the view
of perfection relations and properties. Also, the perfection-relation between the
obligation norm set and its counter-set ought to be preserved if present and so
their intersection must remain empty. This means that it will be expanded to
achieve perfection-properties of being closed under implicants and under the
rule of having at least one conjunct for each member conjunction. Since the
last condition has the disjunctive consequent there may be different ways of
performing the closure. Therefore, the weak-ideal expansion of a counter-set
results in a set of sets.
Definition 4.3 The minimal weak-ideal closure WI(N) of a counter-set is the
set of the smallest sets a satisfying the following conditions:
(i) a includes N : N ⊆ a,
(ii) if ψ ∈ N and ϕ entails ψ and ϕ ∈ Ldoable, then ϕ ∈ a,
(iii) a satisfies one of the following conditions:
(a) if ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ N , ψ /∈ N , ϕ /∈ Cn(N ) and ϕ ∈ Ldoable, then ϕ ∈ a,
(b) if ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ N , ϕ /∈ N , ψ /∈ Cn(N ) and ψ ∈ Ldoable, then ψ ∈ a.
Definition 4.4 Function γ picks an arbitrary member of the set WI(N ) of
weak-ideal sets: γ(N ) ∈WI(N ).
Example 4.5 Let Ldoable = {p, q}. Let N = ∅. Let the only norm be the
norm-permission P(¬p ∨ ¬q). It follows that: p ∧ q ∈ N ; WI(N ) = {{p ∧
q, p, p ∧ ¬q}, {p ∧ q, q,¬p ∧ q}}
The second step The second step in a completion of normative system is
also under-determined and complex in itself. It consists of two phases. In
each of the two phases lists of sentence are being used in the construction.
Lists will be understood as lists of equivalence classes [ϕ] = {ψ |`pl ψ ↔ ϕ}
[ϕ1], . . . , [ϕn], . . . .
(i) In the first phase the obligation norm-set and its counter-set are closed
under appropriate relations by taking into account “partially placed” sen-
tences, i.e., those where only one sentence from a pair of contradictory
sentences belongs to the closure of the system.
N 0 ∈WI(γ(N ) ∪ {ϕ |`pl ϕ↔ ¬ψ and ψ ∈ Cn(N )})
N0 = Cn(N ∪ {ϕ |`pl ϕ↔ ¬ψ and ψ ∈ N 0})
(ii) In the second phase “unplaced sentences” are being added in an iterative
manner to the system. “Unplaced sentences” are those where no sentence
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from a pair of contradictory sentences belongs to the system.
〈Nn+1,Nn+1〉 =
=
{〈Cn(Nn ∪ {ϕn}),Nn ∪ {¬ϕn}〉, if Nn ∪ {ϕ} is consistent,
〈Cn(Nn ∪ {¬ϕn}),Nn ∪ {ϕn}〉, otherwise.







There is no preferred ordering of unplaced sentences. The outcome of
the iterative process depends on the chosen ordering. In most cases the
resulting systems are radically different.
The systems completed by the application of the principle everything not
permitted is forbidden do not necessarily end in one and the same “ideal state
of things”.
Example 4.6 Let N = {p ∨ q} and N = ∅. Expansion of the counter-set by
partially placed sentences and weak-ideal closure of the counter-set together
yield the following set of sets: {{¬p ∧ ¬q,¬p,¬p ∧ q}, {¬p ∧ ¬q,¬q, p ∧ ¬q}}.
So, a choice must be made. Consequently expansion of the obligation-set with
respect to the counter set depends on the set being chosen, and thus it yields
eitherN ′0 = {p∨q, p, p∨¬q} orN
′′
0 = {p∨q, q,¬p∨q}. Finally, the expansion by
unplaced sentences depends on the list used in the construction. Suppose that
List 1 is given by: [q], . . . , and List 2 by:[¬p], . . . . Then N ′1 = Cn(N
′
0 ∪ {q}),
while N ′′1 = Cn(N
′′
0 ∪ {¬p}). Therefore, (p ∧ q) ∈ N
′
1, and ¬(p ∧ q) ∈ N
′′
1 The
completion results in incompatible ideal states as translations show: O(p ∧ q)
w.r.t. N ∗′ , while F(p ∧ q) w.r.t. N ∗′′ .
A critique of Von Wright: how many ideal states? Von Wright did not
consider completion under the principle everything not permitted is forbidden
as not rational, but only as less reasonable then the completion under the
principle everything not forbidden is permitted .
Generally speaking: a legal order and, similarly, any coherent code or system
of norms may be said to envisage what I propose to call an ideal state of things
when no obligation is ever neglected and everything permitted is sometimes
the case. If this ideal state is not logically possible, i.e., could not be factual,
the totality of norms and the legislating activity which has generated it do not
conform to the standards of rational willing. Deviations from these standards
sometimes occur — and when they are discovered steps are usually taken to
eliminate them by ‘improved’ legislation. [11, p.39]
If a normative system is completed under the principle everything not permitted
is forbidden, then, if consistent, it can “envisage more then one ideal state”,
each equally acceptable as the other. Thus, there will be no unique ideal state
with respect to obligation-norms. If intending a unique ideal state is essential to
rational willing on the side of the norm-giver, then the the principle everything
not permitted is forbidden is not only “less reasonable”, as von Wright claimed,
but also not (instrumentally) rational.
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5 Concluding remarks and further research
The term ‘pragmatics’ indicates the study of language-use: the norm-giver is
engaged in the prescriptive use of language while constructing a normative sys-
tem; the norm-recipient uses a system constructed by language use as the basis
of her/his normative reasoning. The term ‘social’ indicates that more than
one language-user (or social role) should be taken into account: the (role of)
norm-giver, the (role of) norm-recipient, the (role of) norm-evaluator. Social
pragmatics of deontic logic studies the norms that apply to norm-related ac-
tivities of social actor roles. These norms can be properly called ‘second-order
norms’ since they cover the activities that are related to a normative-system.
There is a difference between second-order norms which require construction
(envisaging) a logical possible description of an ideal state (e.g., consistency
norms) and second-order norms which are related to the will of the norm-giver.
In the latter case if the aim is to construct a description of exactly one ideal
state, then the second-order norm everything not permitted is forbidden is not
acceptable since it might end in a multitude of equally valid ideal states. The
language of modal deontic logic can be (and perhaps should be) understood as
the language in which perfection properties of a normative system are being
described. The norm-giver and the norm-recipient are related both to the ac-
tual normative-system, which may be imperfect, and to its, possibly missing,
perfection properties (from which second-order norms spring). Logic has some-
times been understood as the ethics of thinking. Von Wright’s reinterpretation
of deontic logic prompts us to understood logic also as the ethics of language
use. In understanding deontic logic the perspectives of different social roles of
should be taken into account as well as the purpose of norm giving activity. In
this way deontic logic ceases to be a “zero-actor logic” and becomes the logic of
language use which requires the presence of “users”. This fact redefines deontic
logic as a research which necessarily includes the stance of logical pragmatics.
This paper is a continuation of the previous research [18] in which the
extension of the pragmatic reading of deontic axioms has been introduced with
respect to the difference of roles of the norm-subject and the norm-applier,
but without separate treatment of permission-norms. Further research should
extend the logical pragmatics approach and address the interrelated topics of
normative reasoning based on an inconsistent normative system, the problem
of conditional norms, and, at the most general level, the determination of
the source of the second-order norms of norm-giving activity and provision of
an adequate logical framework for their formalization. A sketch of possible
directions of further research follows.
A normative vacuum does not appear if the norm-recipient is subordinated
to an inconsistent normative system, in which there is no way out of the nor-
mative conflict on the basis of the metanormative principles on the priority
order over norms. On the other hand, the norm-recipient cannot reason using
classical logic since it would lead to the logical “explosion” (on the side of the
norm-set). The only remaining option is logic revision. In the view of per-
fection properties, some postulates of logic revision can be outlined. The first
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condition that a logic change ought to satisfy is to restore coherence (=non-
explosiveness) of the set whose logic is being changed. Secondly, the change
of logic ought to preserve desirable logical properties. The two conditions of
the logic revision, restoration condition and preservation condition, resemble
the content contraction, but the difference lies in the fact that instead of con-
sistency it is the coherence that is being restored, and, instead of maximal
preservation of the content, it is the desirable logical properties that are be-
ing saved. So, the norm-recipient faced with an inconsistent normative system
ought to adopt an inconsistency-tolerant logic under which the normative prop-
erties will be preserved, namely, closure under entailment and adjunction of the
norm-set together with correlated properties of the counter-set (closure under
implicants and closure under having at least one conjunct for each conjunc-
tion). Is there such a logic? The deontic dialetheic logic of G. Priest [8] seems
to be adequate for the purpose.
The set-theoretic approach must be refined in order to capture the problem
of conditional norms, which requires a more refined treatment of interaction
between “is” and “ought”. The application of the generalized treatment of a
code of requirements as a three-place functions introduced by Broome [2]. It
has been proved in [17] that “for each world-relative code there is a realization
equivalent world-absolute code”, or, in other words, that the narrow-scope and
wide-scope reading have the same effects. The approach should be extended
so to include also “necessary condition conditionals” having the form Oϕ→ ψ
and investigate perfection properties in this respect.
The third topic for the further research has a philosophical character be-
cause of its high level of generality. The relevant theoretical basis for this line
of research can be found in dynamic logic as a logic of effects of language use,
developed by J. van Benthem [9] and the vast group of related researchers.
The essential formula of the theory has the form [C]E and it describes com-
municative act C by its effect E. The inclusion of the actor’s identity in the
C-part has been introduced by Ju and Liu [7], while Yamada [16] has added
deontic effects to the E-part of the formula. Within this framework obligations
of the norm-giver in the prescriptive use of deontic language can be captured
by the formula [g : !∆rϕ]Dgg : !∆
′
gψ, where g and r are the norm-giver and the
norm-recipient, respectively, ! indicates the prescriptive use of deontic sentence,
∆ and ∆′ stand for deontic operators of the first-order, while D stands for a
deontic-operator of the second order. For example, in this perspective to the
perfection property of external consistency there corresponds a second-order
norm type forbidding creation of an externally inconsistent system, which can
be formalized by the formula [g : !Orϕ]Fg g : !Frϕ. A hypothesis worth con-
sidering is the one stating that the use of language in creation of a normative
system is subordinated to the requirements of the second-order normativity,
the normativity of language use, which ought to be studied within logical prag-
matics of deontic logic. 5
5 The author wishes to thank anonymous reviewers for helpful criticism and suggestions.
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Appendix
Proposition .1 `ins τ+(Oϕ ∧ Pψ)→ P(ϕ ∧ ψ)
Proof. τ+((Oϕ ∧ Pψ)→ P(ϕ ∧ ψ)) = (ϕ ∈ N ∧ ¬ψ /∈ N )→ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) /∈ N
1 ϕ ∈ N ∧ ¬ψ /∈ N
2 p¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)q ∈ N
3 ϕ ∈ N 1/ Elim∧
4 (ϕ ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)) ∈ N 2, 3/ 2*
5 (ϕ ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ))→ ¬ψ `pl
6 ¬ψ ∈ N 4, 5/ RcO
7 ¬ψ /∈ N 1/ Elim∧
8 p¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)q /∈ N 2–7/ Intro¬
9 (ϕ ∈ N ∧ ¬ψ /∈ N )→ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) /∈ N 1–8/ Intro→
2
Proposition .2 `ins τ−(O(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Oϕ→ Oψ))
Proof. τ−(O(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Oϕ→ Oψ)) = (ϕ→ ψ) /∈ N → (ϕ /∈ N → ψ /∈ N )
1 (ϕ→ ψ) /∈ N
2 ϕ /∈ N
3 ϕ ∈ N 2/ Comp
4 (ϕ→ ψ) ∈ N 1/ Comp
5 (ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)) ∈ N 3, 4/ 2*
6 (ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ))→ ψ `pl
7 ψ ∈ N 5, 6/ RcO
8 ψ /∈ N 7/ ExtC
9 ϕ /∈ N → ψ /∈ N 2–8/ Intro→
10 (ϕ→ ψ) /∈ N → (ϕ /∈ N → ψ /∈ N ) 1–9/ Intro→
2
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Proposition .3 `ins τ∗(Oϕ→ Pϕ)
Proof. τ∗(Oϕ→ Pϕ) = ϕ ∈ N → ¬ϕ ∈ N
1 ϕ ∈ N
2 ¬ϕ /∈ N
3 ¬ϕ ∈ N 2/ Comp
4 ¬ϕ /∈ N 1/ IntC
5 ¬ϕ ∈ N 2–4/ Elim¬
6 ϕ ∈ N → ¬ϕ ∈ N 1–5/ Intro→
2
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